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Algorithm 959: VBF: A Library of C++ Classes for Vector Boolean 
Functions in Cryptography 
JOSÉ ANTONIO ÁLVAREZ-CUBERO and PEDRO J. ZUFIRIA 
VBF is a collection of C++ classes designed for analyzing vector Boolean functions (functions that map a 
Boolean vector to another Boolean vector) from a cryptographic perspective. This implementation uses the 
NTL library from Victor Shoup, adding new modules that call NTL functions and complement the existing 
ones, making it better suited to cryptography. The class representing a vector Boolean function can be 
initialized by several alternative types of data structures such as Truth Table, Trace Representation, and 
Algebraic Normal Form (ANF), among others. The most relevant cryptographic criteria for both block and 
stream ciphers as well as for hash functions can be evaluated with VBF: it obtains the nonlinearity lin-
earity distance, algebraic degree, linear structures, and frequency distribution of the absolute values of the 
Walsh Spectrum or the Autocorrelation Spectrum, among others. In addition, operations such as equality 
testing, composition, inversion, sum, direct sum, bricklayering (parallel application of vector Boolean func-
tions as employed in Rijndael cipher), and adding coordinate functions of two vector Boolean functions are 
presented. Finally, three real applications of the library are described: the first one analyzes the KASUMI 
block cipher, the second one analyzes the Mini-AES cipher, and the third one finds Boolean functions with 
very high nonlinearity, a key property for robustness against linear attacks. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, vector Boolean functions (functions that map a Boolean vector to another 
Boolean vector) play an important role in various fields of science and engineering, 
such as Coding Theory [MacWilliams and Sloane 1977], Switching Theory [Davio et al. 
1978], and Cryptography [Carlet 2008a, 2008c]. Conventional secret key cryptosystems 
can be expressed as a certain composition of vector Boolean functions. Thus, in cipher 
design, it is essential to define criteria that measure the cryptographic strength (i.e., 
the robustness against attacks) of Boolean and vector Boolean functions. Moreover, 
because of the size and complexity of modern ciphers, automatic analysis programs are 
very helpful in reducing the time required to study cryptographic properties of vector 
Boolean functions. 
In this article, a library of C++ classes for analyzing cryptographic properties of vector 
Boolean functions (VBFs) is presented. This library is called VBF and uses some mod-
ules from the well-known Number Theory Library (NTL) implemented by Victor Shoup 
(VBF works with any version of NTL, up to the latest one [NTL 2015]). A preliminary 
version of VBF, lacking several of the modules and features in the current package, was 
presented in Alvarez-Cubero and Zufiria [2010]. NTL is a high-performance, portable 
C++ library providing data structures and algorithms for manipulating signed, arbi-
trary length integers, as well as vectors, matrices, and polynomials over the integers 
and over finite fields. The decision to use this library is mainly based on four reasons: 
(1) It is free software, and may be used according to the terms of the GNU General 
Public License. 
(2) It provides high-quality implementations of state-of-the-art algorithms for the 
Galois field of order 2. 
(3) It may be easily installed in a wide range of platforms. 
(4) It provides a clean and consistent interface to a large variety of classes representing 
mathematical objects that are useful in cryptology 
The VBF library makes use of all the Boolean mathematical objects defined in NTL 
modules as a starting point. However, it necessarily introduces several new algorithms 
and structures associated with cryptographic criteria in order to address the charac-
terization of real systems, as shown later in this article. 
The main advantages of this approach are derived from the object-oriented im-
plementation and the use of effective algorithms; such advantages are reusability, 
maintainability, extensibility, and flexibility in the analysis of a broad range of vec-
tor Boolean functions employed in symmetric ciphers. The size of the vector Boolean 
functions that can be analyzed by VBF is restricted by the computational resources 
(memory, disk space, CPU, etc.) of the platform on which it is executed. However, the 
maximum value for n and m to be handled by the different functions is conditioned 
by the maximum value attainable by long int variables (for the computer employed in 
this work, it is approximately 230 , so that remax = mmax «a 30). Note that, although these 
size functions would be compatible with the VBF resource management procedures, 
the runtime requirements for computing the characteristics would exceed any realistic 
bound. In order to illustrate VBF applicability in this article, S-boxes used in modern 
symmetric primitives are studied: a modern cipher used very widely in mobile commu-
nications called KASUMI [3rd Generation Partnership Project 2005] is characterized 
together with a Mini version of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard); also, highly 
nonlinear Boolean functions robust against linear attacks are designed. 
At the present time, several other packages are available for analyzing vector Boolean 
functions from the cryptographical point of view, for example: 
(1) CRYPTOOL [2014] is a free, open-source e-learning application, used in the im-
plementation and analysis of cryptographic algorithms. It provides cryptanalytical 
measurement methods (entropy, n-grams, autocorrelation, etc.), but it does not al-
low the calculation of cryptographic criteria. The current release version, CrypTool 
2, is based on the latest .NET Framework (currently .NET 4.0) and it has a pure-
plugin architecture. There is also another project called JCrypTool developed in 
Java and based on Eclipse RCP 
(2) MatPack [2006] is a C++ numerics and graphics library implementing compu-
tational methods that are needed in engineering. The cryptographic algorithms 
are included in the commercial library; these can only be used to analyze some 
cryptographic properties of Boolean functions and do not address vector Boolean 
functions. 
(3) In Bibliowicz et al. [2003], a system for assisting in the analysis of some criteria 
of DES-like ciphers is described. This system analyzes only a small subset of the 
criteria considered by VBF. 
(4) bma [Pommerening 2005a, 2005b] outputs the value table, Walsh Spectrum (WS) 
(a generalized Fourier spectrum), linear profile, differential profile, and some 
linearity/nonlinearity measures, given the ANF of a vector Boolean function. It 
is an open-source executable program written in C, computationally very efficient 
for specific S-boxes analysis. 
(5) The boolfun package [BOOLFUN 2010] is open-source software, written in R, to 
assess cryptographic properties of Boolean functions. It implements three repre-
sentations: Truth Table, ANF, and WS. It can calculate cryptographic properties 
of Boolean functions that are relevant for the design of stream ciphers (i.e., cryp-
tographic pseudo-random generators), namely, nonlinearity, algebraic immunity, 
correlation immunity, and resiliency. Unfortunately, it does not provide specific 
tools for analyzing vector functions. 
(6) SAGE [2014] is free open-source mathematical software that supports research and 
teaching in algebra, geometry, number theory, cryptography, and related areas. The 
Cryptography module contains some descriptions of classical ciphers and simplified 
modern ciphers such as Simplified DES and Mini-AES. Compared with the VBF 
library, SAGE lacks much useful functionality. 
In summary, the packages cited present one (or more) of the following disadvantages: 
they are commercial, they do not benefit from the new paradigms of object orientation 
and generic programming, and/or they do not cover the broad spectrum of representa-
tion and cryptographic criteria for both Boolean and vector Boolean functions that VBF 
does. The aim of the VBF package presented in this article is to provide an easy-to-use 
tool both for the designer and the cryptanalyst of symmetric ciphers. The user only 
needs to code the basic features related to the vector Boolean functions associated with 
a cipher (e.g., Truth Table, ANF table, polynomial in ANF, etc.). 
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the 
main vector Boolean function concepts. Section 3 starts with the general principles that 
influenced the design of VBF and describes the VBF classes related to the initialization, 
cryptographic criteria, and operations over vector Boolean functions. Section 4 gives 
examples of applications of the VBF framework, analyzing the modern cipher KASUMI 
together with the Mini-AES, and designing highly nonlinear Boolean functions. Finally, 
concluding remarks are summarized in Section 5. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
The mathematical theory of vector Boolean functions starts with the formal definition 
of vector spaces whose elements (vectors) have binary elements. Let < GF(2), +, • > 
be the finite field of order 2, where GF(2) = Z2 = {0, 1}, "+" the "integer addition 
modulo 2," and "•" the "integer multiplication modulo 2." Vn is the vector space of re-
tuples of elements from GF(2). The direct sum of x e Vni and y e Vn2 is defined as 
x © y = 0*4,..., xni, yi,..., y„2) e Vn i + n 2 . The inner product ofx, y e Vn is denoted by x • y, 
and the inner product of real vectors x, y e W1 is denoted by (x, y). 
One can now define binary functions between this type of vector spaces, whose 
linearity analysis (for robustness-against-attacks purposes) becomes very important. 
f : Vn -> GF(2) is called a Boolean function and % is the set of all Boolean functions on 
Vn. Ln is the set of all linear Boolean functions on Vn: Í» = {iu Vu e Vn | ¿u(x) = u • x) 
and ftn is the set of all affine Boolean functions on Vn. 
It is possible to characterize Boolean functions via alternative and very useful associ-
ated mappings. In the following, some of these mappings are presented. The real-valued 
mapping / u (x ) = (—1)^=1"^ = ( _ i ) u x for x, u e Vn is called a character. The character 
form of f e in is defined as x/(x) = (- l )^ ( x ) . The Truth Table of Xf is defined as the 
(1, —Yj-sequence vector or sequence vector oí f and is denoted by ¿7 e R2". 
Let f e fnhea Boolean function; the Walsh transform of f at u e Vn is an re-dimensional 
Discrete Fourier Transform and can be obtained as follows: 
X/(u) = ( f / ,^ )=J] ( - l )^ ) + u x . (1) 
xeV n 
The autocorrelation of f e f„ with respect to the shift u e Vn is a measure of the 
statistical dependency among the involved variables (indicating robustness against 
randomness-based attacks). It is the cross-correlation of f with itself, denoted by 77(11): 
Vn -> Z and defined by 
^(u) = J2 xf(x)xf(x+u) = J2 ( - D / ( X ) + / ( u + x ) - (2) 
xeV n xeV n 
The factor ^ is generally omitted (see Carlet [2004]). 
The directional derivative of f e % in the direction of u e Vn is defined by 
A u / , (x )= / - (x + u ) + / , ( x ) , x e V n . (3) 
We call the linear kernel of f the set of those vectors u such that Au/" is a constant 
function. The linear kernel of any Boolean function is a subspace of Vn. Any element u 
of the linear kernel of f is said to be a linear structure of f. 
Given f e fn, a nonzero function g e % is called an annihilator of f if fg = 0. 
We now extend the scope of the study by considering functions between any pair 
of binary-valued vector spaces. F : Vn ->- Vm, F(x) = ( / i (x ) , . . . , fm(x)) is called a 
vector Boolean function and fnjn is the set of all vector Boolean functions F : Vn ->- Vm. 
Each fi, : Vn -+ GF(2) Vi e { 1 , . . . , m} is a coordinate function of F. The indicator function 
of F e fnm, denoted by OF : Vn x Vm -+ {0, 1}, is defined in Chabaud and Vaudenay 
[1995] a s ' 
„ , , Í 1 i fy = F(x) , , , 
^(x,y) = j 0 i f y_ É j F ( x ) _ (4) 
Again, several mappings associated with a vector Boolean function can be defined, 
in similar terms to the case of binary functions. Hence, the character form of (u, v) e 
Vn x Vm can be defined as follows: X(u,v)(x, y) = ( _ i ) u x + v y . Similarly, let F e fn,m be 
a vector Boolean function; its Walsh Transform is the two-dimensional Walsh transform 
defined by 
eF(u, v)=J2J2 0^ (x ' y)*(u,v)(x, y) = E (- Dux+vF(x). (5) 
xeV n yeVm xeV n 
Also, the autocorrelation of F e fnM with respect to the shift (u, v) e Vn x Vm is the 
cross-correlation of F with itself, denoted by r>(u, v) : Vn x Vm ->- Z, so that [Nyberg 
1995] 
rF(u, v)=J2 ^ ( x + u W ( x ) = J2 ( - l ) v F ( x + u ) + v F ( x ) . (6) 
xeV n xeV n 
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Let F e %,m and u e Vn; then the difference vector Boolean function ofF in the direction 
of u e Vn, denoted by AUF e fn,m, is defined as follows: Au.F(x) = F(x + u) + F(x), x e 
Vn. If the following equality is satisfied: AuF(x) = c, c e Vn, Vx e Vn, then u e Vn is 
called a linear structure of F. 
Finally, we define the simplifying notation for the maximum of the absolute values 
of a set of real numbers {Ouv}u,v, characterized by vectors u and v, as max (auv) = 
max(u v) {|auv|}. Using the same simplifying notation, we can define the max (•) operator 
on a set of real numbers {auv}u,v, as max (auv) = max(u,v)^(o,o){|ctuv|}- This notation will 
be used in some criteria definitions. 
3. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY: CLASSES, CRYPTOGRAPHIC CRITERIA, AND OPERATIONS 
The core of the VBF library is the VBF class, which represents vector Boolean functions 
whose data members and member functions make use of the NTL modules listed in 
Table 1.1 of the User Manual that accompanies the software [VBF 2015]. However, some 
new cryptography-related member functions were added to the previous modules. New 
modules, which are not present in NTL, are defined and they are listed in Table 1.2 
of VBF [2015]. 
The main file in the library, called VBF.h, has the definitions of the objects described 
in the next subsection and makes use of the cited modules. 
3.1. VBF Class: Initialization and Representations 
Here we describe the methods that can be used to represent a VBF class related to a 
vector Boolean function F e fnm. Some of these representations can be used to initialize 
a VBF class. 
(1) Truth Table, defined as JF e M2»xm(GF(2)), where 
i(ao) 
(7) 
fiioco) 
fi(a2»-i) 
fmiot  
fm(«l) 
/m(a2»-l) 
satisfying that /¿ i e {1, ...,m} are its component functions; each a¿ = 
(xi,...,xn) e Vn i e {1 , . . . , 2™ - 1} is a vector whose decimal equivalent is 
dec(oti) = i = YTj=ixj2n^ and all the vectors of Vn can be listed so that 
<XQ < Ui < • • • < a 2 i i - i . 
The Truth Table for an re-variable Boolean function f should be in lexicograph-
ical form, that is, Tf = (T/(0), Tf(l), 7>(2),..., Tf{2n-1)). Since the Truth Table 
length might be too large, we represent it in hexadecimal rather than in binary 
notation. The hexadecimal Truth Table is obtained by replacing each 4 bits by their 
corresponding hexadecimal form. For instance, to enter f = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), 
one should just write 3F. 
(2) Trace representation. When m = re, we endow Vn with the structure of the field GF(2n). 
Any F e fn,n admits a unique univariate polynomial representation over GF(2n), of 
degree at most 2™ - 1: 
2 " - l 
f ( x ) = ^ 5 1 x i J , e G F ( n (8) 
8=0 
A general way to derive this polynomial representation is given by a Lagrange 
interpolation from the knowledge of the irreducible polynomial of degree re over 
GF(2) associated with the field GF(2n) and the Truth Table of F. 
The interpolation attack [Jakobsen and Knudsen 1997] is efficient when the degree 
of the univariate polynomial representation of the S-box over GF(2n) is low or 
when the distance of the S-box to the set of low univariate degree functions is 
small. This attack exploits the low degree of the algebraic relation between some 
input (output, respectively) and intermediate data to infer some keybits relating 
the output (input, respectively) and the intermediate data. 
(3) Polynomials in ANF. F can be uniquely represented by m multivariate polynomials 
over GF(2) (called coordinate functions), where each variable has power at most 
one. Each of these polynomials can be expressed as a sum of all distinct Mi-order 
product terms (0 < k < re) of the variables in the form 
f(xi, ...,xn) = a0 + a1x1 -\ hanxn 
+ ai2...nXix2 ...x„= ^ a\ I | [XÍ I = ^ J a\x\ a\ e GF(2), (9) 
leP(A0 \¿el / leP(A0 
where P(A0 denotes the power set of N = { 1 , . . . , re}. This representation of f is 
called the algebraic normal form (ANF) of f. 
(4) ANF table of F, denoted by ANFF e M2„xm(GF(2)), represents the 2n coefficients of 
the polynomials of each of the m coordinate functions in ANF. 
(5) Characteristic function, which is a matrix whose rows are indexed by x e Vn and 
whose columns are indexed by y e Vm in lexicographic order, is denoted by Img(F) e 
M2»x2™(GF(2)) and defined as follows: 
Img(F) 
9F(u0, u0) 
9F(ot-í, oto) 
9F(ct2»-i, a0) 
9F(u0, a2»>_i) 
&F(OCI, a2»»_i) 
9p(u2"-i, a2»»_i) 
(10) 
where 9p(x, y) stands for the indicator function defined in Equation (4). 
(6) Walsh Spectrum, which is a matrix whose rows are characterized by u e Vn and 
whose columns are characterized by v e Vm in lexicographic order, is denoted by 
\NS(F) e M2»x2™(K). It holds that 9F(u, v) = WS(F)(u, v). 
(7) Linearproñle, which is a matrix whose rows are characterized by u e Vn and 
whose columns are characterized by v e Vm in lexicographic order, is denoted by 
LP(F) e M2»x2™(M). It holds that LP(F)(u, v) = ^ |WS(F)(u, v) |2 . 
(8) Differential Proñle, denoted by DP(F) e M2»x2™(R), results from the application of 
the Walsh transform to the linear profile. 
(9) Autocorrelation Spectrum, denoted by P\(F) e M2»x2™(Z), is obtained by Equation (6). 
(10) Permutation vector. If F is a Boolean permutation, that is, it is bijective and has 
the same number of input bits as output bits in = m), then it can be defined as a 
vector: v = (F(l),..., F{n)), where F{i) is the image of the bit i for F. 
(11) Expansion and Compression DES permutations. If F is an affine vector Boolean func-
tion with re ¿^ m in the form of Expansion and Compression DES permutations 
[National Institute of Standards and Technology 1999], then it can be defined as 
an array with m elements, which are the output bits. 
(12) DES-like S-box representation. The VBF class also supports the definition of F as 
given in National Institute of Standards and Technology [1999] for the DES 
S-boxes. 
3.2. Cryptographic Criteria 
The cryptographic criteria that can be evaluated by means of the VBF class are the 
following: 
(1) Nonlinearity, defined as the minimum among the nonlinearities of all nonzero linear 
combinations of the coordinate functions of F; it can be evaluated from the Walsh 
Spectrum in the following way: 
MC(F)= min NC(\ • F) = 2"- 1 - ^ m+ax (WS(F)(u, v)), (11) 
v^0eVm 2 
where the same symbol JVC is employed to denote the nonlinearity of either a scalar 
or a vector function. This criterion is a measure of the distance of a vector Boolean 
function and all affine vector Boolean functions. If this distance is small, it is pos-
sible to mount affine approximations of the vector Boolean functions involved in a 
cryptosystem to build attacks on this system [Matsui 1994]. Thus, this property is 
useful to assess the resistance of a vector Boolean function to linear attacks (in-
cluding correlation attacks), tha t is, attacks where the function F is approximated 
by an affine function. 
(2) For every positive integer r, the rth-order nonlinearity of a vector Boolean function F is 
the minimum rth-order nonlinearity of its component functions; the rth-order non-
linearity of a Boolean function equals its minimum Hamming distance to functions 
of algebraic degrees at most r (see Carlet [2008b] for details): 
MCr{F)= min NCr{\-F)= min mindif, v F). (12) 
v^0eV m v ^ 0 e V m fe% 
Computing rth-order nonlinearity is not an easy task for r > 2. Unlike the first-
order nonlinearity, there are no efficient algorithms to compute second-order non-
linearities for re > 11. VBF library naive exhaustive search is employed for this 
purpose. 
(3) Linearity distance, defined as the minimum among the linearity distances of all 
nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F, may be computed 
from the Differential Profile using 
CD{F)= min CD{\ • F). (13) 
v^0eV m 
The linearity distance of a Boolean function is a characteristic defined by the distance 
to the set of all Boolean functions admitting nonzero linear structures. These in-
clude, among others, all the affine functions and all nonbent quadratic functions 
and are defined as follows [Meier and Staffelbach 1990]: 
CV(f) = d(f, LSn) = min d(f, S). (14) 
Se£5„ 
S-boxes used in block ciphers should have no nonzero linear structures (see Evertse 
[1988]). The existence of nonzero linear structures, for the functions implemented 
in stream ciphers, is a potential risk that should also be avoided, despite the fact 
that such existence could not be used in attacks, so far. 
(4) Balancedness. F e fnjn is balanced (or has balanced output) if each possible output m-
tuple occurs with equal probability 2rm; that is, its output is uniformly distributed 
in Vm. This criterion can be evaluated from the Walsh Spectrum in the following 
way: 
§F(0,\) = 0, V v / 0 e V m . (15) 
Cryptographic functions must be balanced; that is, their output must be uniformly 
distributed over {0, 1} to avoid statistical dependence between the input and the 
output (which can be used in attacks). 
(5) Correlation immunity. F e fnjrl is an (re, m, t)—Cl function if and only if every nonzero 
linear combination f(x) = Y.T=i vi /¿(x) of coordinate functions of Fis an (re, 1, t)—CX 
function or a t — CI function, where x e Vn, u¿ e GF(2) i = 1 , . . . , m and not all 
zeroes. This criterion can be obtained from the Walsh Spectrum as follows: 
§F(u, v) = 0, Vu e V„, 1 < wt(u) <t, V v / O e Vm. (16) 
A function f e % is t — CI if its output is statistically independent of any sub-
set of at most t input bits. Correlation immunity is used to assess the resistance 
to correlation attacks [Siegenthaler 1985]. Note that the statistical measure used 
to assess independency between input and output bits is (conditional) mutual in-
formation. F e fn,m is t - CI if its output distribution does not change when we 
fix t variables Xi. At - CI function, which is also balanced, is called a i-resilient 
function. This criterion is related to an attack on pseudo-random generators using 
combining functions, called a correlation attack. If f is not i-resilient, then there 
exists a correlation between the output of the function and (at most) t bits of its 
input; if t is small, f is prone to a divide-and-conquer attack due to Siegenthaler 
[1985] and later improved by several authors with fast correlation attacks. 
For the pseudo-random generators, the best-known cryptanalytic technique is 
the correlation attack, which is based on the idea of finding correlation between the 
outputs and the inputs, that is, finding S-boxes with low resiliency. 
(6) Propagation. F e %,m satisfies the propagation criterion of degree I (VC(l)) if any 
nonzero linear combination of the component Boolean functions satisfies the VC(l). 
This criterion can be obtained from the Autocorrelation Spectrum in the following 
way: 
rF(u, v) = 0, Vu e V„, 1 < wt(u) <l, V v / O e Vm. (17) 
This criterion is based on the properties of the derivatives of Boolean functions and 
describes the behavior of a function whenever some input bits are complemented. 
F e fn,m is said to satisfy the propagation characteristics with respect to u e Vn if 
and only if F(x) + F(x + u) is balanced. 
(7) Global avalanche is defined by two indicators [Zhang and Zheng 1995]. First, the 
absolute indicator of F, denoted by MAXAC(F), defines the maximum absolute 
nonzero value of the Autocorrelation Spectrum and quantifies the distance to the 
set LSn. Second, the sum-of-squares indicator, denoted by a, is the second moment of 
the autocorrelation coefficients. In order to achieve good diffusion, cryptographic 
functions should achieve low values of both indicators. 
(8) Algebraic degree is defined as the minimum among the algebraic degrees of all 
nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F [Nyberg 1993], namely: 
V£Q{F) = min 
g 
(18) 
where the algebraic order or degree of a Boolean function is the order of the largest 
product term in the ANF. This criterion is obtained by generating the ANF table 
and then analyzing the order of all the linear combinations of coordinate functions. 
Cryptographic functions must have high algebraic degrees. Indeed, cryptosystems 
using vector Boolean functions for confusion (S-boxes in block ciphers, combining 
functions in stream ciphers, etc.) can be attacked if the functions have low degrees. 
Higher-order differential attack [Lai 1994] exploits the fact that the algebraic degree of 
the S-box is low. 
(9) Algebraic immunity of a Boolean function f e fnis defined as the minimum degree 
of all annihilators of f or 1 + f and it is denoted by ATif) [Courtois 2003; Courtois 
and Meier 2002; Faugére and Ars 2003]. A function f should not be used if f or 
1 + f has a low-degree annihilator. If this happens, algebraic attacks [Courtois 
and Pieprzyk 2002] can be executed. Algebraic attacks recover the secret key, or at 
least the initialization of the system, by solving a system of multivariate algebraic 
equations. 
The component algebraic immunity of any F e fn,m, denoted by AX(F), is the 
minimal algebraic immunity of the component functions v • F(v / O e Vm) of the 
vector Boolean function. 
Other useful information in cryptanalysis can be obtained by means of the VBF class 
(see the member functions in Table 4.2 of VBF [2015]): 
(1) The linear potential of F, defined as CP(F) = ^- max (WS(F)(u, v)2), is a measure 
of linearity in linear cryptanalysis and satisfies [Chabaud and Vaudenay 1995] 
2rn < CV(F) < 1 so that the lower bound holds if and only if F has maximum 
nonlinearity (F is bent) and the upper bound is reached when F is linear or affine. 
Linear cryptanalysis is based on the idea of finding high-probable linear or affine 
relations between the inputs and outputs of S-boxes present in the cipher, that 
is, finding S-boxes with low nonlinearity. The attack is mounted by finding high-
probability parity of the sum of some input, output, and key bits, and hence 
deducing one bit of information about the key 
(2) Linear relations associated with a specific value of the linear profile. 
(3) The Differential Potential of F, defined as WiF) =max (DP(F)(u, v)), is a measure 
of the robustness against differential cryptanalysis where 2rm < W(F) < 1 and 
the lower bound holds if and only if F is bent and the upper bound is reached when 
F is linear or affine. The differential uniformity of F e fnjrl and its differential 
potential are related by VV(F) = 2-nVU(F). 
Differential cryptanalysis is based on the idea of finding high-probable differential 
pairs between the inputs and outputs of S-boxes present in the cipher, tha t is, 
finding S-boxes with low linearity distance. Differential cryptanalysis [Biham 
and Shamir 1990] can be seen as an extension of the ideas of attacks based on the 
presence of linear structures [Nyberg 1991]. If u is a linear structure of f, then 
the inputs of difference u result in output differences of 1 or - 1 with probability 
1. In differential cryptanalysis, it is only required that inputs of difference Ax 
lead to a known difference Ay with high probability, or with a probability that 
noticeably exceeds the mean, and hence deducing some information about the key. 
(4) Differential relations associated with a specific value of the Differential Profile. 
(5) The linear structures of F, defined as the vectors for which associated rows in the 
Differential Profile coincide with the vector zero. 
Lai [1990] showed that if f e % has k < n linearly independent vectors 
b i , . . . , bk that are linear structures, then f can be mapped to g e % via a linear 
transformation where 
g(xi, ...,xn) = mixi -\ h mkxk + g'(xk+i,..., x„). (19) 
The cryptanalyst may be able to take advantage of the linear structures in / 
if some of the m¿, i = 1 , . . . , k in Equation (19) are zero, thus eliminating the 
influence of some variables (possibly key bits) on the ciphertext. 
The cryptanalytic value of linear structures lies in their potential to map a 
nonlinear function to a degenerate function via a linear transformation, which 
may reduce the size of the keyspace. 
(6) The maximum possible (for n even) nonlinearity for a vector Boolean function with the 
same dimensions as F e fnjn (when n is even). The functions with maximum 
possible nonlinearity are called bent functions and their nonlinearity is equal to 
2"-1 - 2™/2_1 [Rothaus 1976]. The nonlinearity of a vector Boolean function is de-
fined as the minimum among the nonlinearities of all nonzero linear combinations 
of its coordinate functions. Thus, the maximum possible nonlinearity for a vector 
Boolean function coincides with the maximum possible nonlinearity for a Boolean 
function. 
(7) The type of function in terms of nonlinearity of a Boolean function (only for m = 1), that 
is, if it is linear, almost optimal, or a bent function (F with maximum nonlinearity 
and n even). 
Let f be a Boolean function with n variables. Then f is said to be almost optimal 
if m+ax (WS(F)(u, v)) < 2(re+1)/2 when n is odd, and m+ax (WS(F)(u, v)) < 2(re+1)/2 
when n is even. 
(8) The maximum possible linearity distance for a vector Boolean function with the same 
dimensions as F. 
(9) The frequency distribution of the absolute values of the Walsh Spectrum. 
(10) The frequency distribution of the absolute values of the Autocorrelation Spectrum. 
(11) The cycle structure of an invertible vector Boolean function F e fn_„ (permutation) 
describes the number of cycles and their length. 
A cycle structure with a low number of cycles of high length is considered well 
suited to be used in cipher design. This fact means that many transpositions are 
present. 
(12) Fixed points of F, tha t is, {x | F(x) = x}. 
(13) Negated ñxed points of F, tha t is, {x | F(x) = x}. 
A cryptographic primitive with a high number of fixed and/or negated fixed 
points is considered to be not well designed, since it lacks the needed randomness. 
A list of the member functions related to these criteria may be found in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 of VBF [2015]. For a detailed explanation of the cryptographic criteria and 
their properties, see Alvarez-Cubero and Zufiria [2012]. 
3.3. Operations Over Vector Boolean Functions 
In this subsection, the operations over vector Boolean functions supported by the VBF 
class are described. Some of them correspond to secondary constructions, which build 
in, m) variable vector Boolean functions from {n!, m!) variable ones (with n! <n,m'< m). 
The direct sum has been used to construct resilient and bent Boolean functions [Carlet 
2004]. Adding coordinate functions and bricklayering (also called concatenation) are 
operations used to build modern ciphers such as CAST [Adams and Tavares 1993], 
DES [National Institute of Standards and Technology 1999] and AES [Daemen and 
Rijmen 2002]. Additionally, VBF provides operations for identification if two vector 
Boolean functions are equal, the sum of two vector Boolean functions and the compo-
sition of two vector Boolean functions. The definitions of all the supported operations 
are as follows: 
(1) Let n > 1, m > 1, F, G e fnM. F and G are equal if their Truth Tables are the same. 
(2) Let F e fntP, G e %,m\ then the composition function is G o F e fnjrl. 
(3) Let n > 1, F e fn^n. F^1 is the functional inverse of F if the composition of both 
functions results in the identity function. 
(4) Let n>l,m>l,F,Ge fnM. The sum of F and G (denoted by F + G) is the vector 
Boolean function whose Truth Table results from the addition of the Truth Tables 
of F and G: Tp+o = Tp + TQ. It can be proved that the Walsh Spectrum of the sum 
can be obtained by the convolution of the columns vectors of the respective Walsh 
Spectra. 
(5) Let n = ni + n,2, ni, n,2 > l,m> 1, F e %,um, and G e fn2,m- The Direct Sum of F and 
G is the function 
(F e G) : Vni x j / n 2 -> Vm_ _ ( 2 0 ) 
(x, y) -* (F e G)(x, y) = F(x) + G(y). 
This is a generalization for vector Boolean functions of the construction of Boolean 
functions first introduced in Rothaus [1976]. 
(6) Let n > 1, m = mi + mi,mi,m<i > 1 and F e fnjrll and G e fn,m^- The result 
of adding coordinate functions of F and G is the function (F, G) e fnjm+m, where 
(F, G)(x) = ( / i (x ) , . . . , frni(x), gi(x),..., gm(x)). This is a generalization for vector 
Boolean functions of the method used in the CAST algorithm and studied in Nyberg 
[1995] by adding more than one coordinate function at the same time. 
(7) Let n = ni + n¿, ni, n¿ > 1, m = mi + m¿, mi, m¿ > 1, F e f„umi, and G e íFm,m- T n e 
bricklayer of F and G is the function F\G e íñ,m, where 
(F\G): Vni x Vn2 - • Vmi x Vm2 r 9 1 . 
(x, y) ^ F|G(x, y) = ( / i (x ) , . . . , / ^ (x ) , gi(y),.. .,gm(y)). {¿l) 
This construction corresponds to the bricklayer function [Daemen and Rijmen 2002] 
as a parallel application of a number of vector Boolean functions operating on 
smaller inputs. Some authors call this construction concatenation. 
Table 5.1 in VBF [2015] lists the member functions related to the previous charac-
terizing elements. 
4. EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE VBF LIBRARY 
4.1. KASUMI Cipher Algorithm Evaluation 
This section studies the block cipher called KASUMI; it is used in UMTS [2014], GSM 
[2014], and GPRS [2014] mobile communications systems. UMTS uses KASUMI 
[2014] in the confidentiality (f8) and integrity (f9) algorithms named UEA1 and UIA1 
[KASUMI 2014], respectively. GSM employs KASUMI in the A5/3 key stream genera-
tor, whereas GPRS does so in the GEA3 key stream generator. 
KASUMI encrypts a 64-bit input by iterating a round function 8 times. The round 
function consists of the composition of a 32-bit nonlinear mixing function (FO) and 
a 32-bit linear mixing function (FL). The FO function is again an iterated ladder 
design consisting of three rounds of a 16-bit nonlinear mixing function FI. In turn, 
FI is defined as a four-round structure using nonlinear lookup tables S7 and S9. All 
functions involved will mix the data input with key material. 
In the following, each functional component of KASUMI is studied using VBF with 
the aim to reveal any weakness that could be used as a basis for an attack on the entire 
algorithm. Such study characterizes the S-boxes as well as the FI function. 
4.1.1. S-boxes Characterization. The study of S-boxes <S7 and <S9 shows that they are 
Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) bijective Boolean mappings. In fact, a linear approx-
imation analysis shows that the S"7 nonlinearity (Item JVC in Table II) is equal to 56: 
which is the maximum value for an S-box with seven input variables. Its linear poten-
tial (Item CV in Table II) is equal to 0.015625 and it has a second-order nonlinearity 
(Item MCi in Table II) of 36. Concerning S9, the value for the nonlinearity is equal to 
240 over the best-known bound for an S-box with nine input variables, which is 242. 
Its linear potential is equal to 0.00390625. 
From these results, we can conclude that S7 offers the best immunity against linear 
attacks for a 7 x 7 S-box; in addition, S9 immunity against this type of attack is almost 
optimal. 
A differential approximation analysis shows that the S7 linearity distance is equal 
to 28 over a maximum value of 32 and its differential potential is equal to 0.015625. 
Finally, the value for the linearity distance of S9 is equal to 0 and its differential 
potential is equal to 0.00390625. 
From these results, we can conclude that S7 and S9 do not have an optimal immunity 
against differential attacks. 
The algebraic normal forms of S7 and S9 are given by Equations (22) and (23), 
respectively: 
f\ = X5X6 + X4X6X7 + X3X7 + X2X6 + X2Xi + X\ + X\XQX7 + X1X4X5 + X\X3XQ + X\X2X7 
fl = 1 + X¡¡ + X5X7 + X4X7 + X4X5X6 + X3X5X7 + X2X7 + X2X5 + X2X3 + X\XQ + X\X§XQ 
+X1X4X7 + X\X3XÍ + X\X2X§ 
f3 = 1 + X5X7 + X4 + X4X6 + XQXQ + X3XQX7 + X3X4X5 + X2X7 + X2X4X6 + X2X3X7 + X\XQ 
+X1X4 + X1X4X7 + XIX2 
fi = XQ + X5X6X7 + XQXQ + X3X4 + X2X7 + X2XQX7 + X2X4X5 + X2X3X6 + X\X§ + X\XAXQ 
fs = 1 + XT + X4X7 + X4X5 + X3X5X6 + X3X4X7 + X2X6 + X2X5X7 + X1X7 + X1X6X7 + X1X5 
+X1X3 
/6 = 1 + XQX7 + X3X7 + X3X5 + X2 + X2X5X6 + X2X4X7 + Xi + X1X5X7 + X1X4 + X\X2X3 
/V = X4X6 + X3 + X3XQX7 + X2 + X2X5 + X2X3Xi + X\+ X\X7 + X\XQ + X\Xi + X\X3X§ 
+x\x2x6 + x\x2x3 (22) 
f\ = X%Xg + X7 + X7Xs + X5X6 + X4X8 + X4X7 + X3X8 + X3X5 + X2 + X1X7 + X\XQ 
f2 = 1 + ^8^9 + #7*9 + #7*8 + ^6 + ^6^9 + X6X7 + ^4^5 + *3#7 + #3*6 + #2#7 + ^2^4 + #1 
/a = Xg + XQX7 + XiXs + X4X7 + X4X5 + X3X6 + X3X5 + X3X4 + X2 + XiXs + X1X6 + X1X4 
+X1X2 
/4 = 1 + X-] + X5X8 + X4X5 + X3X9 + X3X8 + X2XQ + X2X5 + X2X3 + X\X± + X\X3 + X\X2 
ft, = XSXQ + X6Xs +X5+ X4X9 + X3X6 + X2Xg + X2X3 + X\XS + X\X7 + X\X6 
fe = X9 + X7XS + X6XQ + X5X7 + X4 + X3X9 + X3XS + X2X5 + X\XQ + X\XS + X\X2 
f7 = 1 + X8 + X6Xg + X5X6 + X4X9 + X3X7 + X3X6 + X3X4 + X2X5 + X2X4 + X2X3 + X\ + X\Xo¡ 
fs = 1 + Xs + XsXg + X6X7 + X5X9 + X5X8 + X4X9 + X4X6 +X3 + X2Xs + X2X7 + X\X4 
fg = 1 + X7Xg +X6+ X4X7 + X3X4 + X2Xg + X2Xg + X2X7 + X1X5 + X1X4 + X\X2. (23) 
These forms show that the algebraic degree of SI is 3 and the algebraic degree of S9 
is 2. The algebraic degree of both S-boxes is low and higher-order differential attack 
can be executed against them. The component algebraic immunity of SI is equal to 3 
and for S9 is 2. As a consequence, algebraic attacks by solving a system of multivariate 
algebraic equations can be executed against SI and especially against S9. 
Concerning the cycle structure, S7 and S9 have no obvious deficiencies, for example, 
a large number of transpositions. S7 has one fixed point, (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) and has no 
negated fixed points. S9 has one fixed point, (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) and one negated 
fixed point, (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). The cycle structure of the S7 and S9 permutations 
is shown in Table I. 
Regarding the second moment of the autocorrelation coefficients, for S7 the absolute 
indicator is 16 and the sum-of-squares indicator is 32,768. For S9 the absolute indicator 
is 512 and the sum-of-squares indicator is 524,288. 
From these results, we can conclude that S7 achieves a fairly good diffusion since its 
absolute indicator is nearer the lower theoretical bound, 0, than the upper bound, 128, 
and similarly for the sum-of-squares indicator where the theoretical bounds are 16,384 
and 2,097,152. S9 does not achieve a good diffusion because its absolute indicator 
coincides with the upper bound, 512, while its sum-of-squares indicator is quite close 
to the lower bound of 262,144. 
Table I. Cycle Structure for S7 and S9 
Cycle Length for S7 
1 
13 
22 
92 
-
-
-
Number of Cycles for S7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-
-
-
Cycle Length for S9 
1 
2 
12 
26 
74 
121 
275 
Number of Cycles for S9 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table II. S7 and S9 Cryptographic Criteria 
S-box 
S7 
S9 
MC 
56 
240 
MC2 
36 
0 
CV 
63 
0 
vsg 
3 
2 
AX 
3 
2 
MAX AC 
16 
512 
a 
32768 
524288 
CV 
0.015625 
0.00390625 
VP 
0.015625 
0.00390625 
A summary of these criteria is given in Table II. 
The Walsh Spectra of the SI and S9 mappings are three valued (except from the 
first row and column value): 16, 0, and —16 for SI, and 32, 0, and - 3 2 for S9. The 
Linear Profiles of the S7 and S9 mappings are two-valued (except from the first row 
and column value): 0 and 256 for S7, and 0 and 1, 024 for S9. The Differential Profile of 
the S7 and S9 mappings are two-valued (except from the first row and column value): 0 
and 32, 768 for SI, and 0 and 524, 288 for S9. The Autocorrelation Spectrum of the S7 
mapping is four-valued: 128, 16, - 1 6 , and 0 for S7, and three-valued for S9: 512, -512 , 
and 0. Having a few-valued WS indicates good cryptographic properties (see Gong et al. 
[2014]). 
The cryptanalysis performed in this section provides, to the best of our knowledge, 
new results about S7 and S9 that do not appear in 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
[2001]. For example, representations of both S-boxes as Truth Table, polynomials in 
ANF, ANF tables, and Walsh Spectrum are calculated (via the Truth Table); in addi-
tion, cryptographic criteria such as nonlinearity, second-order nonlinearity, linearity 
distance, algebraic immunity, absolute indicator, and sum-of-squares indicator are also 
computed. 
4.1.2. FI Function Characterization. The FI function is a 16 x 16-vector Boolean function 
that constitutes the basic randomizing function of KASUMI. It is composed of a four-
round structure using the S-boxes SI and S9 as shown in Figure 1. 
The function FI takes a 16-bit data input / and 16-bit subkey Klij. The input / 
is split into two unequal components, a 9-bit left half L0 and a 7-bit right half RQ, 
where / = L0\\Ro. Similarly, the key Klij is split into a 7-bit component KIÍJJ and a 
9-bit component KIij$, where Klij = KIijj\\KIijt2- The function uses two S-boxes, S7, 
which maps a 7-bit input to a 7-bit output, and S9, which maps a 9-bit input to a 9-bit 
output. It also uses two additional functions that are designated ZEQ and TRQ, where 
ZEix) takes the 7-bit value x and converts it to a 9-bit value by adding two 0 bits to 
the most-significant end and TR{x) takes the 9-bit value x and converts it to a 7-bit 
value by discarding the two most significant bits. The following equations summarize 
the implementation of function FI: 
/ = L0\\Ro 
Klij = KIul\\KIhJ,2 (24) 
Fig. 1. FI function of KASUMI. 
U = Ro Ri = S9(L0) + ZE(Ro) 
U = Ri + KIij,2 R2 = S7(Li) + TR(iii) • 
L3 = R2 R3 = S9ÍU) + ZE(R2) 
U = S7(L3) + TR(R3) R4 = R3 
KI, U,l (25) 
RA 
SKSKRo) + TR(S9(L0) + ZE(Eo)) + KIiJtl) + TR(S9(S9(L0) + ZE(R0) 
+ KIij,2) + ZEiSKRo) + TR(S9(Lo) + ZE(R0)) + KIU1)) (26) 
S9(i2i + KIi,j,2) + ZE(SKRo) + TR(S9(L0) + ZE(Ro)) + KI^). 
The algebraic degree of the FI function for all the possible 65, 536 values of the key 
was analyzed. This study reveals that two values of algebraic degree are obtained: 15 
and 16 with a frequency of 32, 931 and 32, 605, respectively. Such degrees reveal that 
FI has a very good resistance against higher-order differential attacks as the maximum 
possible algebraic degree is 16. 
Concerning the cycle structure, the FI function was analyzed for all the possible 
65, 536 values of the key. There are key values for which the number of cycles is quite 
high; for example, the key 0xa776 has the maximum number of cycles, 2, 907. This 
number of cycles is more than three times the proportion that was present in S9. In 
this case, a higher number of transpositions was expected and it could reveal some 
kind of deficiency. 
For several keys, this function has a significant amount of fixed points and/or negated 
fixed points. The maximum number of fixed points is six for key values: 
0x576c, 0x5c38, 0x66/e, 0x7646, 0x85c2, 0x987e, 0x9a32, 0xa3e/", 0xa5a6, 0xac66. 
0x6064, 0x60e5, 0x6327, 0x65c7, 0x690<i, 0xc4ee, 0xc7e4, 0xca74, 0xc65d, 0xc65d, 
Oxcdll, Oxcdbe, 0xce24, 0xd5da, 0xe3ce, 0xe4e6, 0xe531, 0xea36, 0xe/"5c, 0x/"276. 
0x/"59e, 0xfd44. (27) 
Table III. NibbleSub Truth Table 
Input 
Output 
0000 
1110 
0001 
0100 
0010 
1101 
0011 
0001 
0100 
0010 
0101 
1111 
0110 
1011 
0111 
1000 
1000 
0011 
1001 
1010 
1010 
0110 
1011 
1100 
1100 
0101 
1101 
1001 
1110 
0000 
1111 
0111 
The maximum number of negated fixed points is seven for key values: 
0x2c3c, 0x4041, 0x4343, 0x06e9, 0x518/", 0x59ac, 0xal61, 0xa244, 0xa677, Oxeldl, 
Oxlaee, OxldfO. (28) 
The key value 0x6064 has 10 fixed or negated fixed points and a number of key values 
have nine fixed or negated fixed points: 
0x36d0, 0x4343, 0x5e94, 0x5ff3, 0x6271, 0x682d, 0x6e45, 0x99e3, 0xa677, 0x6750, 
0xc5da, 0xd5da, 0xl67<i, OxldfO. (29) 
This number of fixed and/or negated fixed points is not very high compared with the 
total number of possible inputs/outputs, 65, 536, and we may, therefore, conclude that 
the FI function is reasonably well designed. 
The Walsh Spectra of FI for several keys have also been computed and from this, 
the nonlinearities and linear potentials of FI for the 65, 536 keys have been obtained. 
Nonlinearities range from 31, 534 (with the keys 08le, 2d71, and 52c4) to 32, 049 (with 
the key c6a6) and linear potentials from 0.00048146 to 0.00141818. Although these 
nonlinearity values are far from the maximum possible, 32, 640, the linear potentials 
do not reveal an obvious vulnerability to linear attacks. 
As a summary, the KASUMI analysis with VBF provides values for the character-
istics analyzed that are similar to those obtained in previous studies [3rd Generation 
Partnership Project 2001]. In addition, new characteristics such as the algebraic degree, 
cycle structure, fixed points, negated fixed points, and nonlinearities are also provided. 
A detailed description of KASUMI cipher analysis within "KASUMI Analysis" in the 
"Examples" menu can be found in VBFlib [2015]. 
4.2. Mini-AES Cipher Algorithm Evaluation 
Raphael Chung-Wei Phan presented a version of the AES [Phan 2002], with all the 
parameters significantly reduced while preserving its original structure. This Mini ver-
sion is purely educational and is designed to grasp the underlying concepts of Rijndael-
like ciphers. It may also serve as a testbed for starting cryptanalysts to experiment 
with various cryptanalytic attacks. The Mini-AES cipher is a 16 x 16-vector Boolean 
function and the Mini-AES encryption is performed with a secret key of 16 bits. 
4.2.1. S-box Characterization. The Mini-AES S-box is called NibbleSub, and it defines 
a simple operation that substitutes each input with an output according to a 4 x 4 
substitution table (S-box) given in Table III. These values are, in fact, taken from the 
first row of the first S-box in DES. 
The study of the S-box shows that it defines APN bijective Boolean mappings. In 
fact, a linear approximation analysis shows that the nonlinearity is equal to 2 while 
the maximum value for an S-box with four input variables is 6. Its linear potential is 
equal to 0.5625 and it has a second-order nonlinearity of 0. From these results, we can 
conclude that NibbleSub does not offer good immunity against linear attacks for a 4 x 4 
S-box. 
A differential approximation analysis shows that the NibbleSub linearity distance is 
equal to 0 over a maximum value of 4 and its differential potential is equal to 0.5. From 
the previous results, we can conclude that NibbleSub does not have optimal immunity 
against differential attacks. 
Table IV. Cycle Structure 
Cycle Length 
2 
14 
Number of Cycles 
1 
1 
Table V. NibbleSub Cryptographic Criteria 
S-box 
NibbleSub 
MC 
2 
MC2 
0 
cv 
0 
vsg 
2 
Ai 
2 
MAXAC 
16 
a 
1408 
CV 
0.5625 
VV 
0.5 
The algebraic normal form of NibbleSub is 
/ i = 1 + X4 + X2 + X2X3 + X2X3X4 + Xi + XiX2 + XiX2XZ 
f2 = l + X3X4 +X2+ X2X4 + X\ + X\Xz + X\X3X4 ,„„s 
f3 = 1 + X4+X3 + X3X4 + X2X4 + X2Xz + X\X4 + X\Xz + X\X2 + X\X2X4 + X\X2X3 
f4=X3+ X2X4 + X\ + X\X4 + X1X3X4. 
These forms show that the algebraic degree of NibbleSub is 2, which is not high 
enough to be immune against higher-order differential attacks. The component alge-
braic immunity is equal to 2: as a consequence, algebraic attacks by solving a system 
of multivariate algebraic equations can be easily executed. 
Concerning the cycle structure, it has no obvious deficiencies, for example, a large 
number of transpositions; in addition, it has no fixed points and two negated fixed 
points (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1, 1). The cycle structure is given in Table IV. 
Regarding the second moment of the autocorrelation coefficients, the absolute indi-
cator is equal to 16 and the sum-of-squares indicator is 1,408. Hence, NibbleSub does 
not achieve a good diffusion because its absolute indicator reaches the upper bound of 
16 while its sum-of-squares indicator is quite close to the upper bound of 4, 096. 
A summary of the results for these criteria is represented in Table V. 
Excluding the value of the first row and column, the Walsh Spectrum of the 
NibbleSub mapping takes values among 12, 8, 4, 0, - 4 , - 8 , and -12; the Linear Pro-
file takes values among 144, 64, 16, and 0; the Differential Profile takes values among 
2, 048, 1, 536, 1, 024, 512, and 0; finally, the Autocorrelation Spectrum is five-valued: 
16, 8, 0, - 8 , and -16. 
4.2.2. Mini-AES Cipher Characterization. The algebraic degree of Mini-AES for all the 
possible 65, 536 values of the key was analyzed. This study reveals that only one 
value of algebraic degree is obtained: 14, which indicates that Mini-AES has a fairly 
good resistance against higher-order differential attacks since the maximum possible 
algebraic degree is 16. 
In addition, the cycle structure of Mini-AES was analyzed for all the possible 65, 536 
values of the key. It was found that no key values provide a high number of cycles: the 
key (expressed in hexadecimal representation) 0x9e06 has the maximum number of 
cycles, 28. No deficiency is expected with respect to this criterion. 
For several keys, this cipher has a relevant amount of fixed points and/or negated 
fixed points. The maximum number of fixed points is 7 for key values 0x0352, 0x4661, 
0x5557, and 0x783/". The maximum number of negated fixed points is 9 for key values 
0xlc?96 and 0x7734. The key values 0xld9b and 0x4661 have 11 fixed or negated fixed 
and several values have 10 fixed or negated fixed points: 
0x010a, 0x0164, 0xlce9, 0x24cd, 0x2e38, 0x4al5, 0x5015, 0x7734, 0x783/", 0x9868, 
0x9/"18, 0xa8a/", 0xaec4, 0x6c85, 0xc9ca, 0xd&09, 0x/"580. (31) 
Table VI. Frequency Distribution of the Absolute Values 
of the Walsh Spectrum 
f Values 
fx (4, 30), (12, 46), (20, 226), (28, 210) 
h (4, 30), (12, 46), (20, 226), (28, 210) 
7b (4, 30), (12, 46), (20, 226), (28, 210) 
A (4, 56), (12, 58), (20, 154), (28, 244) 
~k (4, 57), (12, 91), (20, 97), (28, 267) 
Table VII. Frequency Distribution of the Absolute Values of the Autocorrelation Spectrum 
f | Values 
fx ~T0, 129), (8, 298), (16, 60), (24, 9), (32, 2), (40, 13), (512, 1) 
f2 (0, 150), (8, 196), (16, 148), (24, 12), (32, 5), (512, 1) 
f3 (0, 183), (8, 223), (16, 84), (24, 6), (32, 4), (40, 10), (56, 1), (512, 1) 
A (0, 157), (8, 232), (16, 84), (24, 8), (32, 17), (40, 10), (48, 3), (512, 1) 
f5 (0, 192), (8, 156), (16, 129), (24, 9), (32, 13), (40, 3), (48, 6), (64, 3), (512, 1) 
This number of fixed and/or negated fixed points is not very high when compared 
with the total number of possible inputs/outputs (65, 536). We can conclude that the 
Mini-AES cipher is reasonably well designed from this point of view. 
Several Walsh Spectra of Mini-AES for different keys have also been computed, and 
from these the nonlinearities and linear potentials of Mini-AES for more of the 65, 536 
keys have been obtained. Nonlinearities range from 31, 432 (with the key 6960) to 
32, 040 (with the key fide) and linear potentials from 0.000493586 to 0.001662314. 
Although these nonlinearities are far from the maximum possible nonlinearity, 32, 640, 
the linear potentials do not reveal an obvious vulnerability to linear attacks. 
4.3. Search for Vector Boolean Functions with Excellent Profiles 
Boolean functions with very high nonlinearity pose some of the most challenging prob-
lems in the area of symmetric cryptography and combinatorics. For functions with an 
even number of variables, re, the maximum possible nonlinearity 2re_1 — 2™/2~1 is attained 
for the well-known bent functions. However, for the case when re is odd, constructing 
Boolean functions with maximum possible nonlinearity is an unsettled open problem. 
Hence, so far suboptimal results have been mainly obtained via heuristic search; for 
example, for re = 9 the best-known nonlinearity result is 242 [Kavut and Yucel 2010]. 
In this section, we illustrate how the VBF library can be employed to apply a steepest 
descent for a search of nine-variable Boolean functions with the highest nonlinearity. 
Using this algorithm, we have found 5, 121 Boolean functions with nonlinearity 242, 
which can be grouped into five different affine equivalence classes. Two Boolean func-
tions f, g are affine equivalent if the following equality holds: 
g(x) = f(Ax + b) + cx + d, (32) 
where A e MBXB(GF(2)), b, c e Vn, and d e GF(2). 
There are some function properties that are invariant over the mapping defined in 
Equation (32). In fact, the five obtained affine equivalence classes can be identified by 
invariant properties such as the frequency distribution of the absolute values of the 
Walsh Spectrum or the Autocorrelation Spectrum. These invariants have been obtained 
for the five affine equivalence classes with the VBF library, providing the results shown 
in Table VI. 
We have found millions Boolean functions within the classes f\, fi¡, /a, f±, /s . The 
Truth Tables of all these Boolean functions are available from VBFlib [2015]. 
Table VIII. Additional Cryptographic Criteria 
Class 
h 
h 
h 
h 
h 
cv 
118 
120-122 
114, 118 
116,118 
112 
vsg 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
M 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
MAXAC 
40 
32 
56 
48 
64 
a 
324608 
324608 
324608 
343424 
354560 
• m=l 
• ra=2 
• m=3 
• H- -
• m=5 
• ir-S 
• m-7 
• m=S 
• m=9 
• in-10 
• m-11 
• im=12 
m=13 
n=_4 
m=15 
" = " ^ 1 3 , , , , 
r = _ 5 n=16
 n = 1 7 
Fig. 2. Overall CPU time in seconds for cryptographic characterization of re x m S-boxes. 
Using the VBF library, the value of other cryptographic criteria (linearity distance, 
second-order nonlinearity, algebraic degree, algebraic immunity, absolute indicator, and 
sum-of-squares indicator) are easily computed for each one of these Boolean functions. 
Table VIII shows the range of values such criteria take for the functions within each 
class. 
This information allows for an appropriate function selection for cipher design. For 
instance, among all these functions with the highest nonlinearity, we can determine 
those with highest linearity distance (CV = 122, located in the second class). The 
hexadecimal representation of the Truth Tables of these finally selected two functions 
are 
B8FE8F795F6CDA63FA26AC2B2EBB477B7058C266BE53DC0480DF6BFCB8 
A70E54A4E7EFDF91788517C9CF410DA90A10EBCE7A663C2B1F4B2C634DA 
1C1DE5C54AA 
E2A42ADCFAC980395F83F67174E1E2DED5FD983CE40979A1DA85CE591D0 
2540EFEBD4A7A34DDDF4D6C6A1B57F350B54E6BDF3C667145EE89391704 
647BF90EF0. 
These specific functions may be used in the construction of high-performance S-boxes 
for cipher design. 
n=17m=l 
Fig. 3. CPU timing measurements for all functions in Algorithm 1. 
5. COMPUTATIONAL COST RESULTS 
This section assesses and displays the computational performance of the VBF library 
algorithms via its application to a cryptographic characterization of S-boxes with dif-
ferent size rex m. The program, described in Algorithm I in VBF [2015], first generates 
random Truth Tables, which correspond to vector Boolean functions with dimensions 
ranging from n = 4 to n = 17 and from m = 1 to m = 15. It then calculates the 
cryptographic criteria of the vector Boolean functions given from these Truth Tables. 
The calculations were performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM) Í7-2600K CPU @3.40GHz, 
16GB RAM, 1TB Debian Linux. Figure 2 presents the corresponding computing times 
graphically, which happen to be a good measure of the computational complexity, pro-
vided the computer resources are not exhausted. (If m + re is too large for the whole 
computation to take place in the available RAM, then the compute time will increase 
drastically due to hard disk swapping.) 
As expected, in normal computer conditions, the computational complexity grows 
exponentially in the bit length of the vector Boolean functions. 
In Figure 3, we present detailed timing measurements corresponding to the different 
functions tested for the values re = 17 and m = 1. This heterogeneous distribution of 
the computing times reflects the diverse complexity of the different routines provided 
by the VBF library. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, a C++ library designed to analyze vector Boolean functions from a cryp-
tographic perspective has been presented. It represents a very useful tool for analyzing 
cryptographic primitives expressed as vector Boolean functions in a very efficient way. 
This class supports as input a broad range of vector Boolean function representation 
data structures such as Truth Tables, ANF tables, polynomials in ANF, trace represen-
tations, permutation and linear matrices, and DES-like S-boxes. Then it can provide 
new structures that represent cryptographic criteria such as the Walsh Spectrum, Dif-
ferential Profile, and Autocorrelation Spectrum, among others. Cryptographic criteria 
such as nonlinearity, linearity distance, correlation immunity, balancedness, algebraic 
degree, algebraic immunity, and propagation criterion are easily obtained. The behav-
ior of the cryptographic properties of secondary constructions resulting from operations 
over vector Boolean functions can also be studied by means of the VBF class. The ap-
plicability of the library has been illustrated by analyzing real systems such as the 
KASUMI and Mini-AES block ciphers, and by determining Boolean functions with 
very high nonlinearity that are robust against linear attacks. 
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